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As the tremours of the Sokal hoax dissipate, the publication
of Patrick Aidan Heelan’s book, with forewords from Michel
Bitbol, editor Babette Babich and the author himself, offers a
timely invitation to reconsider the relation between quantum
physics and continental philosophy. Heelan does so, as a
contemporary of and interlocutor with Werner Heisenberg
on these issues, as a physicist himself who trained with leading figures of quantum mechanics (QM), Erwin Schrödinger
and Eugene Wigner. Moreover, Heelan highlights Heisenberg’s interest in phenomenology as ‘a friend and frequent
visitor of Martin Heidegger’ (p.55).
Written originally in 1970 and unpublished then for reasons Babich explicates in her foreword, the various nuanced
layers of this book offer a rich tapestry of interwoven arguments with multifarious appeal. It is stamped with the imprimatur of Heisenberg as an accurate account of his understanding of QM, including his philosophy of science—and
as a socio-historical account of the unfolding of the QM
debate in terms of the mutually interacting positions of
the key historical players, for example, Bohr, Schrödinger,
Einstein, Planck, Pauli, Wigner, as well as, most centrally,
Heisenberg. The book also serves as a beautifully lucid, yet
nuanced, account of quantum theory for the non-specialist
reader.
Heelan reopens the issue of the background relation
underpinning the subject-object dualism for a QM that
interacts with phenomenology; this is done in a disciplined
way that avoids the excesses of postmodern discourses
in QM, as part of a questioning in need of revitalisation
after Sokal. Heelan investigates phenomenological conditions, as a structure—a structured precondition of knowledge—impacting on the quantum realm, through an ‘overtly
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phenomenological methodology’ Babich (xvii) in the philosophy of science. Allied with a hermeneutic foregrounding of
language in scientific explanation, Heelan’s The Observable
is a call to arms for a renewal and acceleration of focus on
the relational phenomenological background between subject and object, the observer and observed, as pertinent to
QM.
Heelan’s scrutiny of language in QM explanation is not
simply a concern with terminology shifts between contexts
of observation and explanation along the well-worn terrain
of Wittgenstein (1958) where even terms such as ‘pain’ are
not transferable from one linguistic context to another (Malcolm 1995, pp. 100–2). If so, Heelan would be going no
further than Pais’ (1982) acknowledgment of Bohr’s preoccupation with the role of language in the appropriate interpretation of quantum mechanics, so that terms such as disturbance of phenomena by observation need to distinguish
words like ‘phenomena’ and ‘observation’ from common
usage to avoid confusion. Heelan treads further into linguistic questions, in terms of identification of the hermeneutic
circle between theory and theoretically informed observations. A hermeneutic circle is a mutual relation between a
set of contextual preconceptions (about a text or domain of
investigation), and the way preconceptions shape description
of those facts used to test them. This linguistic questioning
in scientific explanation is examined by Heelan via prior
structure and spaces informing this language.
Heelan goes a step beyond mere acknowledgment of theory-ladenness in observation, a default assumption already
in Duhem, Freud, Popper, Lakatos, Kuhn and Feyerabend,
to adopt a kind of foreground–background questioning as
part of the hermeneutic circle between the language and
meaning system of observation (L1) and the translation of
this into the wider language and theoretical framework (L2)
informing and being informed by the observation. Perceptual
observation involves for Heelan a combination of ‘event recognition coupled with the appropriate horizon recognition’
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(p.96), as ‘the present author’s view that there are necessarily two descriptive languages in quantum mechanics, a QM
event-language and its QM contextual language; the latter
describes the a priori context in which the QM event occurs
and that necessarily conditions the description’ (p.128). Heelan again asks, ‘What relationship did Heisenberg suppose
existed between the descriptive frame of the sign-fact and
the descriptive frame of the signified QM fact when a QM
observation is made?’ (p.102). This is not simply Quine’s
(1961) rejection of discrete event falsification. Heelan’s concern is with the hermeneutic and spatial structure of this
translation process between both levels of scientific language
and explanation for QM.
Here it is tempting to invoke a Gestalt figure-ground relation between these two language levels of description/explanation, building on Hofstadter (1979). Chiming also with
Hofstadter’s preoccupation with conceptual and linguistic
self-reference, including for Gödel’s theorem in mathematics, Heelan’s concern with the background structural relation
between these two levels of language is a first cousin of Heidegger’s self-referential question in Being and Time, regarding the domain over which the ideal and real correspond and
whether this is itself real or ideal ? The hermeneutic circle
offers a self-referential lens upon this background structural
relation, though not explicitly stated as such by Heelan here.
Heelan’s work is far from being merely a historical
account. His is an explicit engagement with the ghosts of
the future. He envisages a revolution to come via Heisenberg’s quest for a reformulation of QM into a meaningful
language that challenges default everyday assumptions about
reality, rather than the Bohr compromise that fits it into the
Procrustean bed of classic mechanical assumptions imbued
in everyday common sense. In Heelan’s words, ‘When relativistic space–time was absorbed into common language,
the description of reality changed. Heisenberg’s early proposal to reinterpret the kinematical variables of physics was
not, however, absorbed by common language. Instead, the
paradigm of complementarity was embraced which did not
change or add to the descriptive predicates of nature but
merely claimed to control their applications by a higher
logic’ (p.106).
The Observable serves as a prolegomenon for a revolution envisaged by Heisenberg, a thwarted revolution that
became flattened in the compromise of the Copenhagen
interpretation agreed by Bohr and Heisenberg. This Copenhagen interpretation filled new wines in old bottles, through
a commitment to QM scientific explanation in the language
of everyday common sense concepts, a commitment of Bohr
that Heisenberg questioned on philosophical grounds and as
ill-suited to the reframing of traditional assumptions of reality. However, Heisenberg ultimately acquiesced to Bohr’s
more conservative explanatory predilections. Nevertheless, as Heelan highlights, ‘The Gifford Lectures [1955–56]
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marked Heisenberg’s return to the germinal principles of his
original insight, namely, to the principle of E-observability
(“Whatever is E-observable belongs to the descriptive ontology of nature”), and to the principle of implicit definition
(“In the case of a physical theory, the descriptive concepts
are defined by and through the mathematical physical theory”)’ (p.112).
Intriguingly, this book opens up fresh vantage points on
a dual layer of silence, uncovered most directly in its final
sentence, that Heisenberg’s future revolution needs to be
unmuted:. ‘It was while exploring the epistemological foundations of quantum mechanics that I rediscovered the revolutionary vision of reality glimpsed by Heisenberg in 1925
and lost soon after in Copenhagen. I hope that others too
will discover this vision and that it may contribute towards
the responsible development of quantum physics.’ p.148.
As significant is his statement here that even this book is
infused with a prior silencing, that it is adapted to a British
and US audience to limit its phenomenological concerns, ‘I
have muted the contribution of phenomenology to Heisenberg’s philosophy of science because it is of little interest to
my American and British readers whose objective interest
tends to be disconnected from the study of the hermeneutical meaning-making processes’ (p.140). This invites the
question as to what an unmuted phenomenology here might
be composed of and if there are clues to these contours in
Heelan’s own text?
It is here that a further step can be made to the Pauli-Jung
correspondence (1949) on seeking a neutral bridge language
between psyche and physis, this neutral language was not
available to Pauli. Despite drawing upon a possible language
of archetypes, parables or in subsequent correspondence of
Pauli (1953) with Jung, where he proposed mathematics as
this neutral language, this issue remained no more than a
promissory note in Pauli’s thought. Perhaps Heelan’s book
points the way towards key components of such a neutral
bridge language, building on phenomenology, though not
explicitly seeking to envision phenomenology in terms of
such a neutral language? Treatment of mathematics as itself
a kind of language would invite scrutiny of prior background
shaping conditions and structures as part of Heelan’s phenomenological questioning of language more generally.
Such a phenomenological structural conditions concern
for mathematics as a language would not simply interrogate correspondences between mathematics and real-world
quantum phenomena. It would ask the question as to the
background domain over which both aspects correspond, as
Heidegger (1927a, b) interrogates the questioning of being
as background itself to the ideal and real, intellectus and res.
However, rather than treating mathematics as expressive of
merely abstract rationalism, as later Heidegger does in his
assault on calculative thinking, with roots of similar concerns in his Basic Problems of Phenomenology (1927), the
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phenomenological search would be for structures underlying mathematics that are shared prior conditions with lived
experience. Can at least some structural features of some
domains of mathematics be embedded in a common realm
with structural conditions for experience? This might move
a phenomenological quest into territories of the unconscious
rather than simply a structure of intentionality, and would
offer resonance with, for example, Matte Blanco’s (1975)
framework of infinite sets and symmetry as an underpinning structure for certain kinds of symbolic associations in
experience. Moreover, Hofstadter (1979) has highlighted a
common structural feature of mathematics and language,
namely, self-referential truth dimensions. While Heelan is
not treading in these waters, his concerns with phenomenological conditions as structures of experience, allied with
mathematics as a language of explanation, and reshaping
spatial assumptions, pave the way for such future steps for a
phenomenology of and through space pertaining to mathematics, in a tradition also of Pauli’s quest for a neutral bridge
language between psyche and physis.
An array of spatially imbued terms inform Heelan’s discourse on language and thought in QM explanation. He recognises the need to shift spatial horizons of understanding
and the threads of barely touched upon assumptions, ‘The
possibility of such new geometrical conventions demonstrates that spatial language is not restricted to the a priori
of classical physics’ (p.105); ‘the spatial relationships…
anomalous according to our usual conventions, do correspond well to the peculiar spatial relationships painted by
Van Gogh and Cézanne.’ (p.105). Space mediates between
the material and symbolic; it involves theory-laden spatial
projections into thought and empirical QM observations, and
our language for this.
Heelan’s QM discourse includes reference to closed
systems, cut, boundary, horizon, hermeneutic circle. This
ineluctable reliance on spatial assumptions, on a spatial
assumption structure is alluded to by Heelan, though not as
an explicit discourse or system of meaning of itself. How
does this spatial discourse interact with physics, is it merely
metaphor or a prior system of conditions? Ricoeur engages
in a similar hermeneutical exposition in The Rule of Metaphor, invoking a plethora of spatial assumptions (proximity, distance, tension, displacement, the ‘open’ structure of
words, closure, transparency and opaqueness) to interrogate
metaphor, assumptions that are tantamount to a prelinguistic discourse, a prior spatial system of meanings (Downes
2016a). Such a phenomenological discourse is not simply
of space as perception but through space, as preconditions
structuring experience.
A more overtly phenomenological concern can run
through paths beyond simply the body or influence acknowledged by Heelan of a ‘neurophysiological system’ (p.61) in
the relation with the QM measuring instrument to interrogate

the role of the instrument in the shift in conditions of experience. Intentionality as a structure gives expression to different modes of being, expressed in the measuring instrument.
A further step, building on Heelan’s concerns with space
underpinning language, is to interrogate this as a relational
space; relational space is not opposed to the physical in Cartesian fashion, but is also physically embedded, though not
reducible to mere place or change of place. A focus on the
measuring instrument or body of the observer can be, at
least in initial terms, allied with a relational space focus
(Downes 2016b), as spatial conditions with physical effects
at a QM level.
What is the common system of relations, prior to the subject-object division, within which the measuring instrument
and observer is embedded interactively with the QM world?
This is a prior system with real-world impact; it is embedded
in some way. Heelan suggests that, ‘The union between the
sensory organs of the human subject and the external instrumentation is a physical union—but not exclusively physical’
(p.97). It is arguably a relational space. Building on Heelan’s words ‘the possibility of a wholeness that unites the
object and the instrument and, on the other, the possibility
of a wholeness that unites the scientist and the instrument.’
(p.97), a relational totality is implied—a relational space.
Heelan opens up a spatial vista for QM language and
interpretation at two distinct though related levels. Firstly,
as the background hermeneutic structure underlying the
transition between the two levels of language of scientific
explanation—direct observation framed in diametric spatial terms of yes/no experimental feedback and the wider
theoretical framework of meaning interpreting the QM data.
Heelan asks, ‘How are these frames related to one another?’
(p.102). Secondly, he invokes a spatial conception of cut,
and speculates on the site of this cut between observer,
measuring instrument and observed. Heelan’s own foreword,
acknowledges that this conception of the cut draws from
leading thinkers in QM, ‘All three, Wigner, Schrödinger,
and Heisenberg, however, were united in their concern with
the nature and meaning of the ‘cut’ (‘Schnitt’ in German)
between the subject and the object in quantum physics.’
(Xxxiii).Thus, the background relation between subject and
object at a QM level is interpreted by Heelan and leading
QM physicists in terms of a quasi-spatial discourse.
In Heelan’s account, ‘For Heisenberg, the process of
measurement is a continuously connected process within
which the QM observer-subject is bodily joined to, yet
mentally distinguished from, the QM observed-object; the
epistemological dividing line between these two is called
the ‘subject/object cut’ or just the ‘cut’’ (p.95); ‘In the first
‘reading,’ the ‘cut’ is in position (1) between the scientist
and the measuring instrument… In the second reading,
the ‘cut’ is between the measuring instrument and the QM
object in its descriptive horizon. In the second reading, the

13

AI & SOCIETY

cut is in position (2), with the scientist joined physically
and epistemologically to the measuring instrument’ (p.95).
Interrogating a principle of division in spatial terms, Heelan
states, ‘One principle of division is spatial: it makes spatial
‘cuts’ which divide physical space into two parts, one which
is ‘internal (spatially)’ to the subject and the other which is
‘external (spatially)’ to the subject’ (p.135); ‘The second
principle of division is subject/object intentionality of meaning making…This divides the ‘space’ of cognitive awareness
of the world by a ‘cut’ that distinguishes the noetic-subject
(knower) from the noematic-object (known)…the known
object is not separated from the subject in any physical or
spatial sense—both subject and object are ‘within the intentional space of human consciousness’ and it is within this
intentional space that the ‘cut’ between subject and object
is made. Such a distinction is not described in physical or
spatial terms, but in phenomenological and epistemological terms’ (p.135). Heelan can be construed as engaging in
a spatial turn through interrogating the spatial assumption
structure of phenomenological conditions framing QM, a
spatial turn invoked in different ways across many disciplines (Downes 2020b). Heelan’s spatial turn is far from
reduction to mere place or change of place.
Yet I would argue that Heelan could take this spatial
argument further, through unmuting a Heideggerian concern with being prior to intentionality. Intentionality as a
phenomenological structure needs and builds from the subject-object dualism, rather than being a constituting condition or process for the construction of this very distinction.
The division principle of cut at the level of intentionality is
predicated on a prior spatial cutting process as a mode of
being. This cut of assumed separation is an implication of
Heidegger’s phenomenological interrogation of object ness,
and through a specific dividing space, a concrete structure
of cut, namely, diametric structured space. As Heidegger’s
Basic Problems of Phenomenology highlights, the realm of
objectness is a standing against, as in the German word for
object, Gegenstand, ‘but instead the being as standing-opposite, as standing-over-against’; diametric space underpins
this opposition as ‘an object…counterposed to the subject’
(p.157). Heidegger does not take the further step of interpreting this spatially imbued oppositional standing-against,
as being a concrete spatial structure of diametric opposition.
Diametric spatial opposition is one aspect of a relational spatial system, to be contrasted with a more connective space
of being-in, dwelling, being-alongside in Heidegger’s Being
and Time—argued elsewhere as expressing an underlying
concentric space (Downes 2012, 2020a).
This cut can also be construed as a compression process,
a condensing process of division, a diametric spatial process.
The ’kind of physical union’ (p.98) is construed by Heelan
as a text, moving into the territory of postmodernism. It is
also a relational space, a relational space encompassing the
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physical. Heelan recognises that this is a reading process,
a hermeneutic process of interpretation. This textual process is placed as a relation between subject and object that
occurs after the subject and object are constituted. A more
Heideggerian phenomenological approach would interrogate
conditions prior to the subject-object dualism. The subjectobject duality is a later emanation from a prior background
process, a prior relational spatial process. Prelinguistic space
mediates between structure and meaning, with real-world
impact as system conditions.
Building on Babich’s apt comments in her foreword to
The Observable, ‘Beyond the phenomenologically attuned
resources characteristic of Husserl’s famed “return” to the
things themselves, perhaps more valuable, at least from the
perspective of an explicitly Heideggerian or even Nietzschean philosophy of science is the questioning (or critical)
component of such an approach’ (xx), an unmuted phenomenology is needed for philosophy of science in QM that is not
simply in Husserlian terms of intentionality but a prior background level of being, resonant with Heidegger’s ontological priority given to possibility. Deconstructing a diametric
split between quantum physics and continental philosophy
need not invoke caverns of relativism or nihilism. While
the ’centre’ of a Kantian epistemology and the rigid edifices of subject-object dualisms cannot hold, Heelan offers
a pathway, far more than mere promissory note, towards
a loosening of traditional frames for a prior truth domain
that is more than the deliberated anarchy of reversals of
Feyerabend (1988). Heelan’s quest rests on prior structured
conditions of experience, a phenomenological relational
wholeness between subject, object and measuring instrument. This is tantamount to a relational space, building on
Heelan’s own spatial discourse here in terms of cut, horizon
and hermeneutic circle. Heelan has opened up vital, distinctive phenomenological and hermeneutic avenues for philosophy of science in relation to QM, and in doing so, implies a
further spatial-phenomenological vista of questioning for a
hermeneutics through space. Heelan’s material, embedded
spatial hermeneutical concerns, applied to QM, are directly
pertinent to this special issue “Material Hermeneutics, Technoculture and Technoscience.”
With Bitbol’s foreword recognising that ‘Schrödinger did
not hide the breath-taking similarities between his philosophical ideas and Schopenhauer’s.’ vii, while Bohr drew
from William James for his conception of complementarity
(Zabriskie 2001, p. xxx), interplay between physics, psychology and philosophy is a fact of history, despite postmodern excesses in QM and reservations of some leading physicists on this interplay. For example, Nobel Prize winning
physicist Steven Weinberg (1996) rejects a dialogue between
physics and the social sciences in general. However, he
views some notable exceptions to this, specifically regarding
space, time and matter, where he recognises that the insights
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of physics on these dimensions may have implications for
the social sciences. Can, as Heelan suggests, the influence
work the other way, in particular for space to reshape future
languages of QM explanation? Can space offer the neutral
bridge language between psyche and physis that the PauliJung correspondence seeks?
An array of Heelan’s distinctive conceptual contributions
include the following aspects of The Observable. He extends
a hermeneutic focus in philosophy of science beyond simply
recognition of theory-ladenness in observation and a concern with language in scientific explanation to interrogate
structural conditions of experience influencing explanation
and relates these to a hermeneutic circle of explanation in
the interplay between different interconnected levels and
languages of scientific explanation. In doing so, he also
distinctively highlights the malleability of spatial framings
in languages of explanation. His further phenomenological
contribution is to interrogate the structure of intentionality
and the ‘cut’ location in the interaction between observer,
measuring instrument and the observed at QM levels of
explanation. Implications of these contributions are that
seeds are emerging of a spatial phenomenological discourse
prior to language pertinent to QM explanation, requiring
further questioning in terms of the ontological status of this
spatial discourse. The relationship of this spatial discourse
to mathematics as a structuration principle underlying some
mathematical explanations relevant to QM, invites further
interrogation if mathematics is construed as itself being
a kind of language with a pre-shaping spatial assumption
structure. While Heelan’s phenomenological focus on the
observer/observed relation is in terms of intentionality, it
leaves open the intriguing phenomenological question as to
whether a prior level of being, as a relation, may also be pertinent to QM scientific explanation. A further step towards a
neutral bridge language sought by Pauli invites interrogation
of diametric spatial and wider spatial structural dimensions
of this. Heelan has both directly and indirectly opened a
range of intriguing and innovative vistas for inquiry, as part
of a replenishment and expansion of Heisenberg’s original
revolutionary interpretation of QM, stalled in the Copenhagen wave-particle duality explanation.
The time-lag delaying the publication of this vital book
across several generations, 50 years in fact, is a salutary
warning against a complacency that assumes that science
is not distorted by power. This is an extension of the point
that competing narratives as Kuhnian paradigms may be
sustained as much by social considerations as by merit of
argument, by institutional and interpersonal incentives to
promote and suppress various lines of inquiry. It locates such
a point in a further set of preconceptions allied not only
with scientific traditions but with epistemological commitments that Western cultures may be loathe to shed. Heelan’s
book serves as an inspiring and highly insightful invitation

to shed the fabric of taken for granted realities as part of an
ontological truth quest for QM, as a step beyond the Copenhagen interpretation of complementarity between quantum
waves and particles, towards fulfilment of a lost vision of
Heisenberg.
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